Why Reform Needs a Client Outside the System — Turkeys Don’t Vote for Christmas!

In any sector, embedding meaningful institutional reform is hard. It demands sustained, coordinated effort, and while the costs are immediate and obvious, the benefits take longer to materialise and are harder to measure objectively. These benefits, however, can be transformative.

In the transport sector, the beneficiaries are the travelling public, who gain better infrastructure, higher service levels and, often, lower costs. Those most directly affected by reform, however, are the public-sector staff who oversee the existing system — and they are typically well connected to the decision-makers shaping it. Few welcome the uncertainty reform brings, and senior decision-makers have often spent decades inside these systems, steeped in the prevailing culture. It is hardly surprising, then, that they prefer the status quo to the disruption of genuine reform — especially if this means a smaller, leaner and more accountable institution.

The result is that most serious reform efforts are defeated before they begin. Such reforms are often conditions attached to much-needed financial support, so lip service is dutifully paid to delivering them. But they are seen as requirements imposed from outside, not as much-needed changes with genuine domestic backing. Too often, the outcome is slow, superficial change — and a corrosive cynicism about reform itself.

Yet the need for change remains — and grows, if institutions ossify while the world around them keeps moving. So what is to be done?

Several approaches can improve the odds of success. One is to place responsibility for reform outside the institution being reformed. It is not reasonable to expect a Minister for Transport to champion measures that would shrink their ministry by up to 90%, or hand decisions and significant budgets to external bodies. This is like asking turkeys to vote for Christmas: it simply will not happen. Recognise this, and lift responsibility for reform above the line ministry, e.g. to Cabinet or Presidential level. This alone will not guarantee meaningful reform, but it materially improves the chances. Above all, it underscores the need for leadership that rises above immediate and personal interests.

Whilst ultimate responsibility for the reforms should lie outside the institutions being reformed (to ensure objectivity), the line ministry (e.g. the ministry for transport) should still be deeply involved in the reform process. It should still have important roles to play in the oversight, monitoring and regulation of the sector. But this important audit role, which should be carried out on behalf of the end users in the sector (e.g. road users), cannot be carried out objectively and transparently if it is also involved in the delivery of the various services that it is supposed to audit. It is important that senior decision-makers take the time to understand this separation of roles, especially as they are the ones who must explain and support the reform process.